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INTRODUCTION
On 10 September 2018, California passed Senate Bill
100, which declares that the Public Utilities
Commission, State Energy Resources Conservation
and Development Commission, and State Air
Resources Board should plan for 100 per cent of total
retail sales of electricity in California to come from
eligible renewable energy resources and zero-carbon
resources by 31 December 2045.1 The bill also
establishes the policy that eligible renewable energy
resources and zero-carbon resources will supply 100
per cent of all retail sales of electricity to California
end-use customers and 100 per cent of electricity
procured to serve all state agencies by 31 December
2045 without increasing carbon emissions elsewhere
in the western grid.2 The bill requires the Public Utilities
Commission and Energy Commission, in
consultation with the State Air Resources Board, to
take steps to ensure the transition to a zero-carbon
electric system for the State of California.3 This will
require incorporation of energy storage mechanisms
for renewable energy into the grid, most likely from
batteries.
In conjunction with these policy goals, California seeks
to dramatically reduce carbon emissions from
transportation.4 This sector accounts for 50 per cent
of  the state’s greenhouse gas emissions, and 80 per
cent of smog-forming pollutants.5 In January 2018,
Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order calling
for a new target of at least five million Zero Emission
Vehicles (ZEVs) in California by 2030 to reduce these
pollutants.6
Similarly, other governments around the world are
also looking to phase out petroleum and diesel.7 The
UK announced plans in July 2017 to phase out sales
of new petrol and diesel cars by 2040, while the EU
tightened its carbon dioxide limits, thus incentivizing
shifts to electric vehicles.8 Similarly, India plans to
replace its entire car fleet with electric models by 2030,
and China now offers subsidies to consumers of
ZEVs, as well as a reward system for manufacturers.9
Resultantly, the market for ZEVs is exploding, which,
in addition to government initiatives, is due in part to
the increasing power and reliability of ZEV batteries.10
Lithium-ion batteries carry four to seven times the
voltage of traditional rechargeable batteries, and some
scientists estimate that future ‘lithium-air’ batteries may
be able to produce enough power to rival petroleum.11
Lithium batteries are expected to make up the vast
majority of the total rechargeable battery market by
2025, both within the ZEV and renewable energy
storage sectors.12 Although there are a few promising
new alternatives to these types of batteries, there are
not yet any viable alternatives to this powerful battery.13
Subsequently, lithium-ion batteries are the batteries
of  choice for General Motors, Honda, Tesla, BMW,
Ford, BYD and Nissan.14 Tesla alone is expected to
produce 35 GWh worth of batteries in 2018, which is
equivalent to the entire world production in 2013.15
The major parts of these batteries consist of several
types of metals. As the demand for these metals
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1 California Senate Bill 100 2018, s 1(b) https://leginfo.
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=
201720180SB100.
2 California Senate Bill 100 2018, s 5; California Public
Utilities Code, s 454.53(a) https://leginfo.legislature.ca
.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB100.
3 ibid.
4 Office of Governor Edmund Brown Jr., ‘Governor
Brown Takes Action to Increase Zero-Emission Vehicles,
Fund New Climate Investments’ (Gov.ca.gov, Jan. 28, 2018)
https://www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/2018/01/26/
governor-brown-takes-action-to-increase-zero-emission-
vehicles-fund-new-climate-investments/index.html.
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
7 Anthony King, ‘Battery Builders Get the Cobalt Blues’ (Chemistry
World, 12 March 2018) https://www.chemistryworld.com/news
/battery-builders-get-the-cobalt-blues/3008738.article.
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 Fred Lambert, ‘Breakdown of  Raw Materials in Tesla’s
Batteries and Possible Bottlenecks’ (Electrek, 1 November
2016) https://electrek.co/2016/11/01/breakdown-raw-
materials-tesla-batteries-possible-bottleneck/.
11 Andrew W Eichner, ‘More Precious than Gold: Limited
Access to Rare Elements and Implications for Clean
Energy in the United States’ (2012) U. Ill. J.L. Tech. &
Pol’y 257, 264.
12 Lambert (n 10).
13 ‘New Battery Technology: Alternatives to Lithium
Batteries’ (Sustaining Our World, 25 January 2018) https://
sustainingourworld.com/2018/01/25/new-battery-
technology-alternatives-lithium-batteries/.
14 Lambert (n 10).
15 ibid.
increases due to policy shifts toward rechargeable
batteries and renewable energy technologies, their prices
will increase.16 However, deposits of these metals are
located in a small number of countries around the
world.17 The most expensive of these elements is
cobalt, which is currently priced at $27,000 per tonne.18
Currently, 65 per cent of  this cobalt comes from the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country with
a complicated history of corruption and political
instability.19 Many artisanal, or small-scale, cobalt mines
in the DRC are linked to human rights abuses, including
child slave labor, and environmental destruction.20
However, as of  February 2016, no country legally
requires companies to publicly report on their cobalt
supply chains.21 Though regulations exist regarding
other ‘conflict minerals’, such as diamonds, gold,
tungsten, and tin, no legislation exists specifically
addressing other minerals, including cobalt.22
Some scholars have suggested that this issue must be
addressed through existing human rights
infrastructure, and that soft law, or law without legally
binding force, may alone be insufficient.23 Although
these binding international law frameworks may help
to address the consequences of these mines pertaining
to human rights and labor law violations, they are
reactive rather than preventative, and do not account
for environmental destruction. Currently, the most
directly relevant international laws are those concerning
due diligence, which companies adhere to when trading
in minerals from conflict zones, such as cobalt from
the DRC.24 Due diligence, similarly to corporate social
responsibility, is a soft law mechanism that companies,
rather than national governments adhere to when
doing business in the mining industry, which seek to
prevent any adverse effects of mining at their source.
Accordingly, this paper focuses on improving these
preventative soft law mechanisms for mining
companies, as well as suggests hard law enforcement
solutions to ensure that they effectively prevent adverse
effects on the planet and people. As a solution, it
proposes the addition of more specific language to
the current UN and OECD due diligence guidelines.
As stricter enforcement mechanisms, this paper also
proposes that nations adhering to due diligence
guidelines enact complimentary national legislation,
such as the US Dodd Franck Act, as well as that they
form and follow an international certification scheme
modeled after the Kimberly Blood Diamond
certification.  To account for the health of  both the
environments and communities situated in and
around artisanal mines for elements such as cobalt,
minerals trade laws must expand the definition of
‘conflict minerals’ to include any minerals the mining
of which causes adverse effects on the environment
and health of populations working and living in and
around mines, including low-conflict and non-conflict
zones. Moreover, ‘effects’ must include environmental
pollution and destruction, along with any other adverse
health effects of mining activities. The addition of
these criteria into due diligence frameworks, as well as
expansion of the definition of conflict minerals, is
vitally important to guarantee the health of miners
for lithium-ion battery supplies as the world
transitions into a new age of electric cars and energy
storage, with the ultimate goal of simultaneously
protecting human rights while reducing greenhouse
gas emissions.
In addressing this issue, this paper will explore where
international environmental law falls short in ensuring
the health and sustainability of artisanal mining
communities in the DRC. Part I will look at current
due diligence guidelines of  the OECD and the UN,
and offer suggestions for incorporating language
directed at reducing the environmental health risks of
the mines for miners and surrounding populations.
Part II will examine the Kimberly Blood Diamond
Certification solution as an example of an
internationally recognized system seeking to reduce
and trace conflict minerals, and address how such a
Cobalt Mining in Congo for Lithium-ion Batteries - Towards Due Diligence Guidelines
??
16 ibid.
17 Eichner (n 11)  264.
18 Lambert (n 10); $81,000 per metric tonne. King (n 7).
19 Lambert (n 10).
20 ibid.
21 John M Jacob, ‘Amnesty International Wants Cobalt
Included in Conflict Minerals Disclosure’ (2016) 11(3)
Corp. Governance Guide 411912 (C.C.H.), WL 41191232.
22 OECD, ‘OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and
High-Risk Areas: Third Edition’ (OECD Publishing, Paris,
2016) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264252479-en.
23 John Burchill, ‘Out of the Heart of Darkness: A New
Regime for Controlling Resource Extraction in the
Congo’ (2010) 10 Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 99, 119;
Josep F Mària SJ & Miho Taka, ‘The Human Rights of
Artisanal Miners in the DRC’ (2012) 3(1) African Journal
of Economic and Management Studies 137, 138.
24 OECD (n 22) 3.
system could help ensure the sustainability of cobalt
supply lines.  Finally, Part III will explore how national
legislation such as the Dodd Frank Act, which is
directed at reducing the amount of conflict minerals
imported into the United States, can serve as an
example for other nations to create similar legislation
that addresses the rights of miners in low-conflict
areas, as well as environmental destruction and
pollution.
1
PART I: ROLE OF MINING COMPANIES:
OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE
AND UN DUE DILIGENCE GUIDE-
LINES
1.1 DRC Cobalt in Lithium-ion
Batteries
Lithium-ion batteries have three major parts: the
anode, cathode, and electrolyte.25 Many different types
of element formulations comprise the cathodes of
lithium batteries, all of which contain various
combinations of cobalt, nickel, manganese, and
aluminum.26 Over 40 per cent of cobalt is used to
make rechargeable batteries, and this is expected to
increase to 55 per cent by 2019.27  Currently, total world
cobalt production is around 100,000 tonnes annually,
around 48,000 tonnes of which go to the battery
industry.28 By 2025, the battery industry alone will
need about 127,000 tonnes of cobalt.29 Although
ZEVs use a lesser percentage of cobalt in their battery
cathodes than smartphones and laptops, they still
necessitate 1000x more of  this metal per battery,
requiring between 10-20 kg (22-44 pounds) rather than
10-20 g of cobalt.30 In order to meet its goal of 5
million ZEVs on the road, California alone will require
as much as 100 million kg (around 220.4 million
pounds) of cobalt by 2030, 65 per cent of which will
likely come from mines in the DRC.31 32
Approximately one fifth of the cobalt mined in the
DRC is extracted by hand by artisanal miners, known
locally as ‘cresseurs’.33 Within thousands of unofficial,
unregulated, unmonitored mines in the southeast
Katanga region of the DRC, men, women and children
work in slave conditions.34  In 2012, UNICEF
estimated that 40,000 children as young as seven work
in artisanal mines across the DRC, many of them
carrying loads of cobalt in intense heat.35
Cobalt exposure presents a variety of health risks,
including damage to the heart, thyroid, lungs, and
skin.36 Although the World Health Organization
reported that exposure to cobalt and breathing in its
dust fumes can cause these long-term health problems,
none of the cresseurs wear gloves or masks.37 This
causes health effects ranging from tumors to
mysterious infections, metabolic and respiratory
problems, burning sensations in eyes and throat,
tumors, genetic deformations, and sterility.38
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25 Lambert (n 10).
26 The Tesla model S uses a nickel, cobalt, aluminum
combination, comprised of 15 per cent cobalt, 5 per
cent aluminum, and 80 per cent nickel, while,
comparatively, the Tesla Powerwall uses 33.3 per cent
cobalt, nickel, and aluminum. In contrast, an Apple
iPhone uses a cathode comprised 100 per cent of cobalt,
and the Nissan Leaf uses a cathode that is 100 per cent
manganese. ibid.
27 ibid.
28 ibid.
29 ibid.
30 King (n 7).
31 Lambert (n 10).
32 This is also equivalent to 100,000 metric tons, 14,285
elephants, 500 blue whales.
33 Alex Crawford, ‘Meet Dorsen, 8, Who Mines Cobalt to
Make Your Smartphone Work’ Sky News (28 February
2017) https://news.sky.com/story/meet-dorsen-8-who-
mines-cobalt-to-make-your-smartphone-work-10784120.
34 ibid.
35 Artisanal Cobalt Mining in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Escri. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/
MapJournal/index.html?appid=847b1b69cbee471ea
75aa06ce5d6c90b.
36 ibid 751.
37 Crawford (n 33).
38 ibid; Jeune Afrique, ‘RD Congo : la pollution minière à
Lubumbashi en pleine lumière’ Jeune Afrique (12 August
2016) https://www.jeuneafrique.com/348793/societe/
rd-congo-pol lut ion-miniere-a- lubumbashi-ple ine-
lumiere/.
Furthermore, studies have confirmed that increased
concentration of cobalt in the body directly correlates
to proximity to cobalt mines.39
One of the greatest sources of exposure for these
populations is waterways.40 Though forbidden by the
Congolese mining code, cresseurs frequently rinse
minerals in streams or rivers, effectively amplifying the
cobalt exposure of local populations.41 Because these
streams are often the only source of water for local
communities, people have no choice but to drink
contaminated water.42 Some mining companies
attempted to build wells to provide residents with a
clean water source, but locals report that the quality is
often not good, and the wells are not well-
maintained.43 Not only does artisanal mining affect
the miners themselves, but it also degrades riparian
zones, and creates heavy erosion and water pollution.44
The erosion often leads to the collapse of houses and
the mines themselves.45 Thus, artisanal mining
directly contributes to the deterioration of health of
the river systems, wildlife, and people.
Informal and artisanal mining in the eastern Katanga
region46 increased considerably after the two armed
conflicts that occurred in the DRC between 1996 and
2002.47 Starting in 2002, foreign mining companies
began exploring, exploiting, and processing the trade
of cobalt and copper in this province.48 Some mining
companies own the sites directly, and some merely
have processing plants.49 The former frequently relocate
citizens working or living near the site or the plant,
often triggering mass protests and violent exchanges,50
and the latter merely buy the ore extracted by artisanal
miners.51 The companies without sites operate in three
basic models: (1) private companies buy ore from
artisans, often seeking a monopoly of the ore in
question, in exchange lending food and money to the
artisans, and restricting the capacity of the artisans to
sell ore at higher prices; (2) companies with storage
capacities in their own plant negotiate with traders who
then negotiate with artisans, normally involving an
agent from the company and an agent from the trader,
who normally accept lower prices to avoid transporting
to a new facility; (3) partnerships between a company
and an artisanal co-op for the exploration of a site,
normally during which the company uses its
technology to explore the site, and the co-op then sells
the ore exclusively to the company.52 In the latter of
these models, political parties and gangs control the
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39 A Belgian study conducted in the Katanga region
compared the concentrations of cobalt in urine samples
of people from between 3-10 kilometers away from
mining sites to a control group of people 400 km from
mining centers, along with the typical concentrations of
this element within the United States, EU nations, and
Japan. The results showed that 11 per cent and 53 per cent
of the subjects residing moderately close and very close
to pollution sites exceeded the occupational limit value,
with 87 per cent of children in areas closest to mining
and smelting sites containing cobalt levels exceeding the
occupational limit.  The study concluded that the single
most important factor determining the variability in urinary
excretion of metals was area of residence.  Célestin
Lubaba Nkulu Banza and others, ‘High Human Exposure
to Cobalt and Other Metals in Katanga, a Mining Area of
the Democratic Republic of Congo’ [2009] Environmental
Research 109, 745, 747-50.
40 ibid 750.
41 Christophe De Brouwer and Myriam M Elenge,
‘Identification of  Hazards in the Workplaces of  Artisanal
Mining in Katanga’ (2011) 24(1) International Journal of
Occupational Medicine and Environmental Health 57, 61.
42 Andreìs Zaragoza Montejano, ‘In Search of  Clean Water:
Human Rights and the Mining Industry in Katanga, DRC’
(Waterlex, IPIS, November 2013) < https://reliefweb.int/
sites/reliefweb.int/fi les/resources/In%20search%
20of%20clean%20water%20-%20Katanga%20DRC.pdf> 3.
43 ACIDH, Unheard Voices: Mining Activities in the Katanga
Province and the Impact on Local Communities (Centre
for Research on Multinational Corporations, November
2011) https://www.somo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2011/
12/Unheard-Voices.pdf.
44 ‘Artisanal Cobalt Mining in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo’ (Escri. 2018) https://www.arcgis.com/apps/
MapJournal/index.html?appid=847b1b69cbee471ea75
aa06ce5d6c90b.
45 ibid.
46 It is important to note that in 2015 this province was
divided into four separate provinces: Tanganyika, Haut-
Lomami, Lualaba and Haut-Katanga. Many works of
literature still refer to this region the single Katanga
Province. For the purposes of this paper, I will be
referring to these provinces, and the region collectively,
as the Katanga region.
47 Mària and Taka (n 23) 144.
48 ibid.
49 Mària and Taka (n 23) 145.
50 In October 2004, there was a massacre of 28 individuals,
both rebels and civilians, by the Congolese army near
the site of Dikulushi, owned by Anvil Mining. During
this conflict, Anvil’s cars and planes transpor ted
Congolese soldiers, who were later accused of war
crimes. ibid  145.
51 ibid.
52 ibid  146.
conflict, widespread violence or other risks of harm to
people’, and areas of political instability or repression
with widespread human rights abuses and violations
of  national or international law.60 The guidance defines
due diligence as ‘an on-going, proactive and reactive
process through which companies can ensure that they
respect human rights and do not contribute to
conflict’.61 Specifically, risk-based due diligence refers
to the steps companies should take to identify and
address ‘actual or potential risks’ in order to prevent or
mitigate adverse impacts associated with their activities
or sourcing decisions.62 These risks encompass the
adverse impacts of  a company’s operations, such as
harm to people, reputational damage, or legal liability,
that result from its own activities or its relationships
with third parties, including suppliers and other entities
in the supply chain.63 64
Regarding sourcing, the model policy states that the
company will neither tolerate, nor profit from,
contribute to, assist with or facilitate the commission
by any party of any forms of human rights abuses,
forced or child labor, or crimes against humanity.65 It
also states that the company will immediately suspend
or discontinue engagement with suppliers linked to
or committing these activities.66 For artisanal miners,
co-ops, often without the artisans’ best interest in
mind.53
Despite the fact that artisanal mining raises serious
challenges to the workers’ human rights, the
environment, and the greater population of mining
sectors, this industry is vitally important to the
livelihood of countless individuals in the DRC. 54 It
is estimated that cresseurs constitute the largest segment
of the DRC mining sector, with between 500,000 to
two million workers, and, with an average of 4-5
dependents for each artisan, the number of people
dependent on this activity is roughly 8-10 million.55
Thus, it is essential that this sector continue to provide
vital employment opportunities for these DRC citizens
without putting their health and safety at risk.
1.2 Inter national Due Dilig ence
Standards: OECD Due Diligence
Guidance
The most widely accepted international standards used
by mining companies are based on the concept of due
diligence. The first standard is a non-binding OECD
Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains
of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk
Areas (OECD Guidance), which recommend that
OCED Members and non-Member adherents actively
promote the observance and integration into corporate
management systems of the OECD Guidance by
companies in the mineral supply chain that supply or
use minerals sourced from conflict-affected or high risk
areas.56 Its ultimate goals are to help companies respect
human rights and avoid contributing to conflict
through their mineral sourcing practices, to cultivate
transparency and sustainable corporate engagement,57
and to serve as a common reference for all suppliers
and other stakeholders in the mineral supply chain.58
The United Nations Security Council supports these
recommendations.59
The Due Diligence Guidance defines ‘conflict-affected
and high-risk areas’ to include ‘the presence of armed
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53 ibid.
54 ibid 138.
55 ibid.
56 Mària and Taka (n 23) 9.
57 ibid.
58 ibid 12.
59 ibid 3.
60 OECD (n 22) 13.
61 ibid.
62 OECD (n 22) 13.
63 ibid.
64 It offers a five-part due diligence framework for both
OECD members and non-members alike, involving the
following five steps: (1) establishing strong company
management systems, (2) identifying and assessing risk
in the supply chain, (3) designing and implementing a
strategy to respond to identified risks, (4) carrying out
independent third party audit of supply chain due
diligence at identified points in the supply chain, and
(5) reporting on supply chain due diligence.   Within
this framework, the guidelines consistently emphasize
public communication and reporting, as well as the
creation of a system of checks and controls over the
traceability system, which is left to both the specific
industry and individual companies.  ibid 17-19.
65 ibid 20-21.
66 ibid 21. This section further references the Responsible
Jewellery Council, Standards Guidance, ‘COP 2.14
Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining’, which provides that
companies must ‘supporting the wider community by
locally sourcing the provision of as many goods and
services as possible; eliminating child labor as a condition
of  engagement in the community; improving women’s
conditions in ASM communities through gender
awareness and empowerment programs’. ibid 27.
which include the DRC cresseurs, the guidance’s model
policy specifies that the company must minimize the
risk of exposure of artisanal mining communities to
‘abusive practices’.67 This supplement distinguishes
between artisanal and small-scale producers and
enterprises,68 stipulating that only enterprises are
expected to carry out due diligence.69
1.3 Inter national Due Dilig ence
Standards: UN Due Diligence
Guidelines
In 2010, the UN published very similar non-binding
Due Diligence Guidelines (UN guidelines) for the
responsible supply chain of minerals from ‘red flag
locations’ to mitigate the risk of providing direct or
indirect support for conflict in the eastern part of the
DRC.70 Unlike the OECD Guidelines, these guidelines
specifically apply to individuals and entities with supply
chains in the DRC.71
The UN guidelines state that individuals and entities
should adopt supply chain policies that require that
individuals and entities will not tolerate any direct or
indirect support for armed groups from the eastern
part of the DRC or criminal networks and perpetrators
of  human rights abuses within the State’s armed
forces.72 To assess the risk of  supporting armed
groups, the UN guidelines require adherents to
compare the factual circumstances of their supply
chains with the supply chain policy in the UN guidelines
because they often indicate the risks of providing direct
or indirect support to armed groups or sanctioned
individuals and entities.73
The UN guidelines recommend that, at a minimum,
refineries and smelters be audited to examine due
diligence processes to mitigate the risk of providing
direct or indirect support to armed groups from the
eastern part of the DRC.74 The UN Guidelines also
recommend that audit organizations act in accordance
with international auditing standards.75 Unlike the
OECD guidance, the UN guidelines make no mention
of  the artisanal mining sector specifically.
1.4 Due Diligence Guidelines:
Improvements
Both guidelines fall short of addressing three
important considerations regarding the sustainability
of mining communities, thus neglecting a large
portion of the population of cobalt miners.
First, the OECD definition of ‘high risk area’ focuses
on areas that violate international or national law, as
well as areas of conflict, which includes widespread
violence or other risks of  harm to people. Similarly,
the UN guidelines emphasize not exacerbating conflict
by providing support for armed groups or perpetrators
of human rights abuses. Although it is important to
not exacerbate and contribute to armed conflict, ‘harm
to people’ also occurs in low-conflict areas, or areas
outside of active war zones, notably within and around
the artisanal mines for cobalt, through environmental
pollution and land-grabbing76  In the Katanga region,
which is nowadays considered a low-conflict zone,77
there are nearly 150,000 artisanal miners, and, with an
average of 4-5 dependents per artisan, the number of
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67 ibid.
68 The guidelines define Artisanal and Small-scale Mining
Enterprises as ‘Artisanal and small-scale entities that are
sufficiently formalized and structured to carry out this
Guidance’. It defines Artisanal and Small-Scale mining
generally as ‘formal or informal mining operations with
predominantly simplified forms of exploration,
extraction, processing, and transportation… a normally
low capital intensive and uses high labor-intensive
technology’. OECD (n 22) 65.
69 ibid 64.
70 ‘Due diligence guidelines for the responsible supply
chain of minerals from red flag locations to mitigate the
risk of providing direct or indirect support for conflict
in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (United Nations, 2013) < https://www.un.org/
News/dh/infocus/drc/Consolidated_guidelines.pdf>
Similarly to the OECD guidelines, the UN guidelines
involve five steps: (1) strengthening company
management systems, (2) identifying and assessing risks
in the supply chain, (3) designing and implementing a
strategy to respond to identified risks, (4) ensuring
independent third party audits, and (5) publicly disclosing
supply chain due diligence and findings. ibid 1-8.
71 ibid 1.
72 ibid.
73 ibid 4.
74 UN (n 70) 5.
75 Specifically, ISO 19011:2002. ibid 5.
76 See description of types of mining companies in
beginning of this section: ‘relocate citizens working or
living near the site or the plant’. ibid 5.
77 Mària and Taka (n 23) 144.
people dependent on the cobalt artisanal mining sector
in this region is nearly 750,000.78 The overall population
of the four provinces in this region is over 10 million,
nearly four million of which reside in the southern
Haut-Katanga province,79 which contains substantial
cobalt deposits and mining operations.80 Thus,
because hundreds of thousands of people live in and
around these low-conflict zones, focusing on only
conflict-affected areas disregards not only the cresseurs,
but also a substantial amount of the population that
is adversely affected by cobalt mines.
To remedy this, some scholars suggest that company
policies and due diligence standards should take into
consideration different conflict levels, accounting for
the human rights of workers both low and high
conflict areas.81 For example, one suggestion is that
companies introduce policies centered around peace-
building in high conflict zones, while focusing on open
and trustful dialogue between companies, local
administrations, artisans, NGOs and local
communities in low-conflict zones.82 In doing so,
companies can both better understand and address
localized issues, as well as adequately frame bottom-
up policies around local populations.83
Second, because mining operations rely on pollution
prone technologies and the controls on the discharge
of pollutants from mines and smelters are lax or non-
existent, the air, water, soils and vegetation near the
mining centers tend to be severely contaminated with
toxic metals, which adversely affects the health of those
living in the area.84 As a solution, the guidelines must
place greater emphasis on mitigating these effects by
conducting frequent environmental assessments,
including the health of the local communities, and
providing miners with other sources of rinsing water
besides streams and rivers in order to ensure that mining
activities do not continue to harm local populations.
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Finally, despite environmental regulations addressing
this problem within the mining code,85 there is a lack
of effective government oversight and assistance to
artisanal miners in enforcing these regulations.86 In
addition to environmental regulations, the Congolese
mining code requires those working in the artisanal
miners sector follow certain regulations relating to
safety, environmental protection and hygiene, but there
are no specifications regarding the equipment they
must use, in line with International Labor
Organization Conventions or recommendations.87
Furthermore, SAESSCAM, the DRC government
body created in 2003 to protect artisans, does not have
enough resources or transparency, which effectively
facilitates the exploitation of artisanal miners by
traders, corrupted government officials, customary
chiefs and armed groups in conflict areas.88
Furthermore, as of 2018, the DRC is ranked 161 out
of 180 in the corruption perception index, which makes
it very difficult for DRC government bodies such as
SQESSCAM to effectively enforce its mining code.89
The International Labour Organization (ILO)
primarily adheres to the 1999 Conclusions of the ILO
tripartite sectoral meeting on small-scale mining, which
puts primary responsibility of monitoring small scale
mines on the local governments. Within the 1999
Conclusions addressing safety and health, child labor,
and environmental issues in small-scale mining, the
ILO concluded that it is the responsibility of
government to establish appropriate legal and
regulatory framework, including monitoring and
enforcement provisions.90  It also states that since there
is a lack of data on occupational safety and health in
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small-scale mines and their communities, governments
should establish a regime for effective reporting on
safety and health performance in small-scale mining,
as well as for the frequency of the use of child labor.91
It also encourages the ILO to get increase its efforts to
further encourage member States to ratify the Safety
and Health in Mines Convention, which the DRC has
still not ratified.92
Thus, because the ILO puts primary responsibility on
the DRC government to address regulation of small-
scale mining, as well as the inability of the DRC
government to effectively enforce its regulations, it is
essential that mining companies follow guidelines that
adhere to both the local mining code and international
mining guidelines.
The UN and OECD guidelines should accordingly
place greater emphasis on helping local governments
improve their ability to enforce local mining regulations.
Though the OECD guidelines emphasize that
companies should utilize a third party audit system to
ensure that they further due diligence efforts, they could
be more effective by instead providing governments
within mining communities with guidelines and
training to monitor the environmental health effects
of the workers, as well as to comply with the already
rigorous environmental regulations of the Congolese
mining code. One suggestion from a study of
workplace hazards for artisanal miners is to introduce
a ‘minimum of mechanization and modernization’
into these mines, which will help to ensure that they
stay technologically up-to-date.93 In essence, this would
require companies to provide the tools and
technologies to the mines necessary for workers to
stay safe and healthy, as well as to continue to mine
without destroying the environment. This excellent
solution would help to ensure that workers in artisanal
mines do not continue to needlessly suffer due to the
extended use of outdated and unsafe mining tools
and techniques, while also making up for the lack of
effective oversight and assistance within artisanal
mines.
2
PART II: CERTIFICATION: EXAMPLE
OF THE KIMBERLY BLOOD
DIAMOND CERTIFICATION SOLUTION,
AND ITS POTENTIAL APPLICATION
TO COBALT
2.1 Role of  Major Cor porations:
Tesla and A pple
Many companies such as Apple and Tesla are working
toward drastically reducing cobalt use in their lithium-
ion batteries. Tesla stated in its 2017 conflict minerals
report that it has not uncovered human rights abuses
in its supply chains.94 Additionally, it visited many
cobalt mines and processing plants of its main supply
chain, as well as potential future suppliers throughout
the world, to discuss major human rights risks they
face and the practices they implemented to mitigate
these risks, including third-party audits and
engagement with local communities to maintain a
positive social license to operate.95 Tesla CEO Elon
Musk tweeted that Tesla’s next generation of  car
batteries will use no cobalt whatsoever.96 Similarly, in
March 2017, Apple announced that it would stop
buying cobalt from artisanal mines until it was
confident that ‘appropriate protections’ were in place.97
Apple also issued guidelines to its suppliers for
detailing its policies on human rights, environmental
protections, and responsible business practices in its
supply chain,98 as well as conducts regularly auditing
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of every smelter providing cobalt in its supply chain.99
Apple reportedly may even decide to buy some of the
mines to purchase cobalt directly from miners, rather
than having to go through a third party supplier.100
However, an international certification scheme could
still be very helpful in order for companies such as
Apple and Tesla to more easily verify the sustainability
of their minerals supply chains, as well as to ensure
that their cobalt suppliers indeed follow due diligence
standards and their corporate visions of conflict-free
cobalt supplies,.
2.2 Kimberly Blood Diamond
Certification: Overview
One of the most widespread international initiatives
to ensure due diligence in the mineral trade realm is
the Kimberly Blood Diamond Certification solution.
This scheme, established in Kimberly, South Africa in
2003, seeks to curb the link between illicit trade in
rough diamonds and armed conflict.101 Blood
diamonds are rough, unpolished diamonds, the trade
of which directly contributes to armed conflict in
nations such as Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the
DRC.102 In 2005, it was estimated that nearly 85 per
cent of  Congolese diamonds were smuggled out of
the country, robbing approximately $40 million from
the DRC’s gross domestic product.103 The 74 countries
that participate in the Kimberly certification scheme
represent 98 per cent of global rough diamond trade
and production.104
The scheme requires each participating nation to enact
legislation requiring that all imports and exports of
rough diamonds are certified under the scheme, and
banning the trade in rough diamonds with non-
participating countries.105 Additionally, each import
or export of rough diamonds must be transported in
a tamper-resistant container and accompanied by a
government-validated Kimberly Process Certificate.106
The scheme also requires each nation to issue an official
commitment reflecting and upholding the goals of
the scheme, and to meet annually to discuss and
monitor the progress of the program.107 Countries
that do not participate face ‘isolation’ from the
diamond-trading world.108 In this way, the Kimberly
Scheme creates a market incentive by requiring nations
to participate in the Kimberly scheme in order to fully
participate in the international diamond trade.
The Kimberly Certification does not require each
participating nation to provide any official means for
enforcing this legislation, but several members enacted
legislation to enforce the Kimberly scheme’s
restrictions.109 For example, in 2003, US the Senate
and House of Representatives passed the Clean
Diamond Trade Act, which prohibits the importation
of diamonds into the United States that do not meet
the Kimberly Certification requirements.110
2.3 Broader Kimberly-Inspired
Scheme for Conflict Minerals
An expanded version of the Kimberly Certification
scheme could cover a large variety of minerals. Such a
scheme should oblige suppliers to list the country and
mine of origin, guarantee that the mine does not
violate human rights or contribute to environmental
destruction, include a uniform enforcement standard
for participating nations with baseline national
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No such international councils exist for minerals
containing valuable metals, such as cobalt, likely due
to the fact that diamonds themselves are the final
product traded and bought, while cobalt makes up
merely a piece of the final product (i.e. it is one of
many different ingredients that compose smartphones
and ZEVs). Thus, without this extra layer of both
awareness and motivation to comply with a certification
scheme, traders would have less to lose if they did not
comply with a similar certification for cobalt. There
are, however, international councils for the electronics
industry, such as the Electronic Industry Citizenship
Coalition, which founded a conflict minerals rule
encouraging its members to avoid using conflict
minerals as part of their codes of conduct.116
Accordingly, it would be up to the electronics and motor
industries, notably those manufacturing lithium
batteries, to look out for and refuse to do business
with those who do not comply with the theoretical
certification scheme’s requirements, as well as to ensure
the effectiveness of  third-party auditing.117
Additionally, the proposed minerals scheme should
include a baseline monitoring and enforcement system
for all participating nations to follow. Currently, there
is still no international monitoring system for the
blood diamond trade, nor is there a uniform
enforcement and punishment requirement for
participating nations to enforce the scheme.118
Without a uniform requirement for non-compliance
among nations, as well as without an international
watchdog system to police the trading of these
minerals, illicit traders deal more frequently within the
nations with softer punishments, thus defeating the
Kimberly scheme’s goals of  curbing the blood
diamond trade.119 As a remedy, the scheme should
require that all nations adopt the same baseline
punishment mechanism, while calling on mining
companies and participating nations with greater
requirements, and apply to minerals originating in both
conflict and non-conflict zones.
There have been some efforts to label minerals beyond
diamonds as conflict free through ‘bagging and
tagging’ programs. These usually apply within conflict
zones for specific minerals, such as tin.111 However,
sometimes the people tagging the bags of  minerals
simply lie about the minerals’ origins, and companies
do not always diligently comply with their own
voluntary verification programs.112 A broader
internationally-backed scheme would eliminate this
issue by requiring private companies and governments
alike to work together to comply with the certification
scheme in order to remain in the market for importing
and exporting minerals.113
To obtain the certification, the company trading the
minerals would have to first verify that the minerals
neither contributed to armed conflict or the destruction
of the environment. It would then be up to the importing
country to verify that the certification was not forged,
and that the mine of origin indeed complied with the
certification’s requirements. The certification would have
to pay special attention to nations with mineral
monopolies, such as the DRC for cobalt, to be sure
that they follow the guidelines despite their dominant
presence and influence in the market.114
However, one of  the biggest differences between
diamonds and cobalt is that there are international
councils for diamonds and jewelry, such as the World
Diamond Council, World Federation of  Diamond
Bourses, and International Diamond Manufacturers
Associations, which push for nations to adopt the
scheme, and vow to expel traders found dealing blood
diamonds in violation of the Kimberly scheme.115
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resources to help developing nations, such as the DRC,
with enforcement. This will help ensure that all nations
have sufficiently similar and harsh punishments to
deter the trading of minerals from mines that do not
comply with the mineral certification scheme.
As an additional check on compliance with the
certification system, another solution is to allow
individuals to take action in the local legal system. For
the Kimberly scheme, some suggest that individuals
should be allowed to bring a private right of action
against companies found to be in non-compliance with
the scheme.120 Applied to cobalt, individuals directly
affected by artisanal mines could bring suit within their
home jurisdictions against companies in
noncompliance with the scheme, which would
encourage companies to comply with certification
requirements in order to avoid prosecution.121 These
individuals could also bring suit against the local
government officials should there be evidence of either
negligence or corruption in enforcing mining
regulations. This is consistent with growing accordance
among scholars of the importance of allowing local
populations to participate in a more meaningful and
influential way in enforcement of the ethical trade of
minerals originating in their soil.122
Finally, it is essential that participating nations enact
legislation to accompany the minerals certification
scheme and to guarantee that all minerals from all
parts of the nation are certified. Like the due diligence
guidelines, the Kimberly Scheme focuses on curbing
trade from areas where there is armed conflict, while,
as discussed above, harm to people as a result of the
mines occurs outside of war and high-conflict zones
due to environmental destruction and pollution in
surrounding communities. The link between the mines
and the destruction of the health of surrounding
ecosystems and communities will have to be concretely
proven in order to incentivize nations to participate in
and comply with such a broad certification, much like
the work that was put into uncovering the contribution
to armed conflict of the illicit blood diamond trade.
Such proof could provide exactly the incentive necessary
to create an international certification scheme for all
minerals.
3
PART III: ROLE OF NATIONAL
GOVERNMENTS: EXAMPLE OF
THE DODD FRANK ACT
3.1 Dodd Frank Conflict Miner als
Overview
In addition to an international certification scheme to
enforce the Due Diligence guidelines, governments
should create national enforcement mechanism for the
trade of minerals linked to human rights abuses. One
example is the 2010 US Dodd Frank Act (‘the act’),
which addresses ‘conflict mineral’ trading. This act is
one of many great examples of a sweeping legislative
scheme by a national government that expands key
concepts of the Kimberly Scheme to other minerals
beyond diamonds, and can serve as an example for
other nations to create and improve upon in their
own conflict minerals regulations.
The ‘Conflict Minerals’ section of the act states that
Congress was concerned for the exploitation and trade
of conflict minerals originating in the DRC that finance
conflict ‘characterized by extreme levels of violence’.123
Thus, the act seeks to promote peace and security in
the DRC by supporting international efforts to
monitor and stop commercial activities involving the
natural resources of the DRC that contribute to the
activities of armed groups and human rights
violations.124 It also aims to develop stronger
governance and economic institutions to facilitate and
improve transparency in the cross-border trade
involving the DRC’s natural resources, to reduce
exploitation by armed groups, and to promote local
and regional development.125
120 ibid 235.
121 ibid  235.
122 Pacifique Manirakiza, ‘Towards an African Human Rights
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Chi. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 6.
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The Conflict Minerals section provides guidance to
commercial entities seeking to exercise due diligence
when assessing the origin and chain of custody of
conflict minerals used in their products. It also lists
punitive measures that could be taken against
individuals or entities whose commercial activities
support armed groups and human rights violations
in the DRC.126 The act further requires that any person
must annually disclose whether conflict minerals that
are necessary to the functionality or production of a
product manufactured by the person originated in the
DRC or an adjoining country.127 If  so, the person
must submit a report describing the measures they
took to exercise due diligence on the source and chain
of custody of such minerals, including a certified
independent private sector audit.128
The act defines ‘conflict minerals’ as cassiterite,
columbite-tantalite (tantalum), gold, wolframite
(tungsten), or their derivatives, or any other minerals
or their derivatives determined by the U.S. Secretary of
State to be financing conflict in the Covered
Countries.129 Cobalt has likely not been added to the
list yet because the Secretary of State has not made
such a finding for this metal or, subsequently, the
minerals from which it is derived. ‘Covered countries’
are the DRC and adjoining countries, or countries that
share an internationally recognized border with the
DRC.130
Though there are no specified punitive damages within
the Dodd Frank Act, the U.S. Attorney General has
discretion to bring a civil action under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act.131 This act applies to any
individual who uses ‘any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce’ to influence foreign officials to
gain an advantage, influence a decision, or influence
illegal action, and upon a proper showing, a permanent
injunction or a temporary restraining order shall be
granted without bond.132 Similarly, for any domestic
concern other than an issuer, any officer, director,
employee, agent, or stockholder may be fined up to $2
million for entities, $100,000 for individuals who are
US citizens, and $10,000 for individuals who are not
US citizens.133 Thus, in the event that bribery or
coercion within the conflict minerals trading realm is
discovered under the Dodd Frank Act, the person or
entity could be liable under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act for monetary and punitive damages.
In addition to the Dodd Frank Act, similar regulations
now exist within other nations. The European
Union’s Conflict Minerals Regulation will come into
effect on January 1, 2021.134 This act similarly defines
conflict minerals as those used to finance armed groups,
fuel forced labor and other human rights abuses, and
support corruption and money laundering, and it
specifically covers tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold.135
It will require that EU companies in the supply chain
for these minerals ensure they import from responsible
and conflict-free sources only.136 These legislations will
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and list all known conflict mineral processing facilities
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hopefully also serve as effective models for legislation
that diminish and expose conflict within the
international minerals trade.
Notably, in December 2015 China adopted the Due
Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply
Chains, based on the OECD Guidance, but it has not
yet enacted national legislation to back this up.137 China
has invested considerably in the African minerals trade,
especially regarding cobalt. Eight of the 14 largest cobalt
miners in the DRC are Chinese-owned, and China
produces more than 80 percent of the production of
cobalt chemicals needed to make batteries.138 Most
recently, the Chinese companies China Railway
Engineering Corporation (‘CREC’) and Sinohydro,
established a $9 billion joint Sino-Congolese venture,
named Sicomines, designed to provide the DRC with
$6 billion of infrastructure in exchange for copper and
cobalt mining concessions, and $3 billion in developing
new mining areas.139 However, this deal was
scrutinized under allegations of corruption when the
$23 million signing bonus for Gecamines, the
Congolese partner involved, disappeared.140 These
sorts of allegations are standard in Chinese-financed
programs that typically lack transparency, despite
generally increased adherence of Chinese companies
to corporate social responsibility principles.141 Thus,
as China’s presence in the African minerals trade grows,
it is particularly important that it enact additional
national legislation to increase transparency and
decrease corruption in the cobalt trade.
3.2 Dod d F rank Act:  Impr ove-
ments
The Dodd Frank Act has the potential to serve as an
example for future national legislation. However, there
is much room for improvement within the future
legislation of other nations. Much like the due diligence
guidelines, the act focuses mostly on areas of high
conflict, and makes no mention of damage to the
environment or people living in the surrounding
communities of the mines. The definition of ‘conflict
minerals’ also only includes four minerals and excludes
many important minerals involved in lithium battery
production, such as cobalt. This is one reason why
some critique the Conflict Minerals section as being
too vague, which creates additional obstacles to effective
and efficient compliance.142 Without defining ‘conflict
minerals’ to include any minerals coming from both
low and high conflict regions, there is no check on the
environmental destruction and health effects of
minerals from artisanal mines coming into the United
States. As a solution, the language could be expanded
to allow national governments to add to the list of
conflict minerals if they fund conflict, violate local laws,
and/or causes harm to the environment and
surrounding communities.
Furthermore, although the Dodd Frank Act has the
potential to expose and hold liable corporations for
bribery and coercion within the mineral trading
sphere,143 there are no punitive damages or injunctions
for the environmental destruction and adverse health
effects that result from artisanal mining operations.
Because some criticize the conflict minerals section as
placing an unrealistic burden on the SEC to regulate
human rights abuses, an area outside of  the SEC’s
traditional scope or regulation,144 creating liability for
environmental destruction and subsequent health
effects in the mining context could be much more
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feasible because they can be more directly traced to the
mining activities rather than actions of third-party
groups and broader civil unrest in the nation in
question. This is still an ongoing problem in the cobalt
trade that must be addressed by national legislature in
order to ensure that no more people are harmed in the
making of lithium-ion batteries. Thus, expanding
liability within national legislature to any damage to
the environment, and subsequently human health, is
vital to ensuring that artisanal mines will neither
exacerbate environmental destruction, nor continue
to cause adverse health effects for local populations
situated in and around the mines.
As another improvement to any future national
legislation modeled off of the Dodd Frank Act, some
scholars suggest that legislation should require
companies trading in conflict minerals to create
different regulations for individual minerals, rather
than simply lumping them all together under the same
scheme.145 For example, since gold is so much more
valuable than other currently listed conflict minerals,
smugglers tend to fly their supplies over borders to
avoid dealing with land-based regulations.146
Encouraging companies to create specific strategies for
each mineral could help ensure that illegal mines and
minerals do not fall through the cracks due to
generalized protections that allow for loopholes to
trade uncertified minerals.147
Specifically regarding China, Chinese companies
typically do not consider the development of social
indicators beyond economic growth, such as socio-
political development, as preconditions for economic
development assistance and sustainable development.148
Thus, because it is poised to be a dominant player in
the mining industry, particularly in politically
tumultuous nations such as the DRC, it is essential
that China creates national legislation for its businesses
to compliment the due diligence guidelines, and the
Dodd Frank Act can serve as a valuable example of
such legislation. In particular, Chinese legislation must
seek to enhance transparency and strengthen both the
socio-political development and economies of the
DRC and all other nations known for corruption.
3.3 Complimentar y Le gislature:
Tax Incentives
In addition to punitive damages, some suggest that
tax incentives designed to reward technological
innovation with reduced rare minerals can help
corporations to diversify supply chains for rechargeable
batteries and, ultimately, to curb their dependence on
conflict minerals.149 Currently, since almost all existing
technologies rely on rare elements in order to function,
increasing incentives to develop technologies that
depend on more abundant elements will help ease the
pressure put on mines to produce rare and expensive
conflict minerals.150 Similarly, tax incentives can help
encourage companies to design recycling mechanisms
for lithium-ion battery minerals in order to curb
dependence on cobalt from artisanal mines, such as
those in the DRC. Currently, there is very little recycling
of rare minerals, and the majority are simply thrown
away at the end of  the battery’s life.151 Tax incentives
can help to bring more attention this issue, as well as
to encourage governments and businesses to continue
to develop green technologies with less dependence
on rare minerals from conflict nations.152
However, legislation must also address the impact of
reducing trade of conflict minerals on the artisanal
miners job security and livelihoods. One article found
that diminished corporate interest in the Congolese
mineral trade is devastating for local communities
because in most mining communities, artisanal mining
is the only paid employment available.153 Often, there
is no other work available except subsistence agriculture
or joining a militia.154 In order to avoid leaving affected
populations with no safe alternatives to support
themselves, as well as perpetuating conflict, some
suggest providing monetary assistance to affected
mining communities, hiring displaced workers as
taggers or otherwise involving them in a minerals
tracing program (such as the theoretical program
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discussed above), as well as collaborating with local
participants to implement Dodd Frank’s Conflict
Minerals requirements.155
CONCLUSION
In order for the world to sustainably transition into
an age of ZEVs and energy storage without causing
further harm to the environment or to people, the
international regulations surrounding the trade of
minerals for lithium-ion batteries require expansion
and precision. The OECD and UN due diligence
guideline must incorporate language that accounts for
areas where environmental pollution from artisanal
mines adversely affects the health of surrounding
communities.156 Specifically, ‘harm to people’ must
include people residing in low-conflict areas, or areas
outside of active war zones, notably within and around
the mines for cobalt, whose health is at risk due to
pollution from the mines. In order to adequately
encompass harm to the environment upon which these
populations depend, guidelines should require
companies to conduct environmental assessments of
artisanal mines, regardless if they own them, to ensure
that they do not pollute nearby rivers and waterways.
In addition, due diligence standards must also require
that companies guarantee effective local government
oversight of these issues by providing them with
resources to monitor the environmental and health
effects around the mines, as well as to comply with the
local Congolese mining code.157
As enforcement mechanisms for these voluntary soft
law schemes, an international certification scheme such
as the Kimberly Blood Diamond Certification could
incentivize companies trading minerals such as cobalt
to follow through with due diligence efforts. Similarly,
this certification must not only encompass high conflict
areas, but also low-conflict areas that suffer from
environmental destruction and pollution from the
mines. In addition, the certification must also
encourage participating nations to enact legislation such
as the Dodd Frank Act or the upcoming EU Conflict
Minerals Regulation, if  they have not already done so.
All legislation should include punitive damages for
companies that do not follow through with due
diligence or otherwise continue to not meet the
certification’s requirements.
Further research is needed to concretely connect the
polluted water in communities surrounding artisanal
mines with cobalt mines, as well as to determine
whether and which mining companies are already taking
environmental destruction into account when issuing
their due diligence reports. Alternatives to lithium
batteries, especially cobalt, will be essential looking
forward, as well as more ways to efficiently recycle these
batteries and minerals.158 However, it is also essential
to find a balance between reducing dependence upon
conflict minerals for future technologies and the
maintenance of the job security and livelihood of local
populations who depend on artisanal mining to
survive.159
In the meantime, legislature and guidelines protecting
against human rights abuses and damage to the
environment will ensure that artisanal mining
communities in low-conflict zones receive the attention
that they deserve. In doing so, the world may adopt
increasingly rigorous climate change policies that no
longer lead to suffering and environmental destruction.
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